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ABSTRACT
In recent years, IoT platforms and systems have been rapidly emerg-
ing. Although IoT is a new technology, new does not mean simpler
(than existing networked systems). Contrarily, the complexity (of
IoT platforms and systems) is actually being increased in terms of
the interactions between the physical world and cyberspace. The
increased complexity indeed results in new vulnerabilities. This
paper seeks to provide a review of the recently discovered logic
bugs that are specific to IoT platforms and systems. In particular,
17 logic bugs and one weakness falling into seven categories of
vulnerabilities are reviewed in this survey.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Leveraging devices connected to the Internet, IoT (Internet of Things)
platforms and systems have been significantly enhancing the in-
teractions between the physical world and the cyberspace (e.g.,
clouds). These interactions not only enable users and enterprises to
gain better situation awareness of the physical world events they
care about, but also enable optimized actuation and physical effect
generation (e.g., changing the temperature in a room).
In recent years, IoT platforms and systems have been rapidly
emerging. Taking smart homes as one example, according to Statista
research, more than 45 million smart home devices were installed
in 2018, and the annual growth rate of home automation is 22% [20].
Taking enterprise IoT as another example, as stated in a recent
survey conducted by Microsoft [14], “The enthusiasm for IoT adop-
tion is global, and it also crosses industries. Among the enterprise
IoT decision makers we surveyed, 85% say they have at least one
IoT project in either the learning, proof of concept, purchase, or
use phase, with many reporting they have one or more projects
currently in ‘use’.”
Although IoT is a new technology, new does not mean simpler
(than existing networked systems). Contrarily, the complexity (of
IoT platforms and systems) is actually being increased along the
following dimension: The IoT technology introduces not only a
significant number of nodes (e.g., IoT devices) to the global informa-
tion grid, but also a significant amount of various cyber-physical
∗These authors contributed equally to this work.
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Figure 1: Overview of IoT Platform Architecture
relationships. The increased complexity provides the adversary
with not only new vulnerabilities to explore, but also new opportu-
nities for attackers to compromise an IoT platform in a previously
unexpected manner.
Motivated by the above observation, this paper seeks to provide
a review of the recently discovered security vulnerabilities that
are specific to IoT platforms and systems. In particular, the review
will be dedicated to recently discovered logic bugs in IoT platforms
and systems. By “logic bugs”, we mean the vulnerabilities directly
associated with the design logic of (certain part of) an IoT platfor-
m/system. It should be noticed that since this paper aims to provide
a dedicated review of logic bugs, low-level security bugs (e.g., buffer
overflow vulnerabilities in IoT firmware) are out of the scope of the
paper.
The remaining of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will
present the system model of a typical real-world IoT platform. In
Section 3, we present a classification of the recently discovered logic
bugs in IoT platforms and systems. In Sections 4-10, we provide a
review of seven categories of logic bugs, respectively. In Section 11,
we comment on the lessons learned through this literature review.
In Section 12, we conclude the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 IoT Platform Architecture
Although individual IoT platforms adopt different strategies for
commercialization, when it comes to the general design, all of them
are very similar. As shown in Figure 1, typically, there are three
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major entities involved on an IoT platform: IoT devices, the IoT
cloud back-end, and the smartphone companion mobile app.
All the services provided by IoT devices is enabled by their brain
— the IoT cloud. Generally, it is usually responsible for three kinds
of services, denoted as Authorization Management, Device Control,
and Home Automation. First, in order to ensure that only the device
owner and delegated users have access to their device, the IoT cloud
needs to authenticate the owner and device, and maintain a one-
to-one binding relationship between the owner’s account and the
device. The binding relationship will be built when the device is
first set up. Second, in order to allow users to control a device
remotely, the device control service serves as a “proxy” when users
send remote commands to the device. Lastly, most IoT platforms
support home automation applications (i.e., IoT app), in which users
can customize their own automation rules or install automation
apps from official automation apps market (e.g., SmartThings’s
SmartApps) or third-party services (e.g., IFTTT). These services
are typically triggered by events. The role of the IoT cloud is to
check the permission of automation application and to send control
commands to the devices.
IoT devices equipped with embedded sensors and actuators col-
lect physical states and events from the surrounding environment
and send them directly or via a hub to the cloud. According to how
the devices interact with an IoT cloud, we can classify them as two
types, namely cloud-connected devices and hub-connected devices.
WiFi-enabled devices can connect to the Internet and thus most
of them are cloud-connected devices that are designed to directly
communicate with the IoT cloud. Other energy-economic devices
are not equipped with a WiFi interface. Instead, they need first
connect to a hub/gateway using energy-efficient protocols such as
Z-Wave and ZigBee. Then the hub connects to the IoT cloud on
behalf of the IoT devices. We call the devices connected to a hub
as hub-connected devices. Note that although most IoT platforms
support both kinds of devices, IoT devices are designed to interact
wit cloud only through the hub in some IoT platforms, thus all these
devices are hub-connected devices including WiFi-enabled devices.
The last kind of entity on an IoT platform is mobile apps. They
provide users with an interface to setup device (e.g., providing the
WiFi credential), manage devices (e.g., binding a device with its
owner’s account) and install or create home automation.
2.2 IoT Device Bootstrapping
Before the device can be remotely controlled and monitored by the
authorized user, there are several steps to setup the device. Although
IoT platforms use different ways to implement the deployment of
new devices, we found most of them are very similar. Typically,
this whole setup process is called IoT device bootstrapping.
(1) Device Discovery/Pairing: After the user has installed the
official mobile app of the IoT platform, he logs in the mobile
app with his registered account and physically hard reset the
device (e.g., pushing reset button). Then he needs to discover
the IoT device by scanning the QR code on the device label
using the mobile app or manually selecting the target device
model name listed in the mobile app. The app will then
broadcast the discovery message. The target device responds
by reporting to the app the basic device information such as
MAC address, device model, and firmware version.
(2) Internet Provisioning: To access the Internet, WiFi-based
devices can use several off-the-shelf mechanisms, including
Access Point Mode [7], WiFi Direct [1] and SmartConfig [10]
to achieve WiFi provisioning. Other types of devices using
ZigBee or Bluetooth can indirectly connect to the Internet
through hub or smartphone.
(3) Device Registration: The IoT cloud identifies a legitimate
IoT device by a unique device ID, which is themost important
identity information of a device. The IoT platforms usually
adopt the following two ways to provided device IDs. First,
IoT devices send their unique information (e.g., MAC address,
serial number) and some legitimacy credential (e.g., embed-
ded secret) to the cloud. The cloud verifies the legitimacy
and generates a device ID, which is returned to the device
and written to the device’s persistent storage. The cloud also
keeps the device ID for future authentication. Second, some
IoT platform providers who also fabricate their own device
usually generate the device IDs beforehand and hard-coded
into the devices during fabrication.
(4) Device Binding: The IoT cloud binds the device ID with
the user account. Note that binding request could be directly
sent by mobile app or forwarded by device. As a result, only
the authorized user can access the device via the cloud. If
other users request to bind the same device again, the cloud
will refuse this request unless the device has already been
unbound.
(5) Device Login: The device uses the device ID to log in to
the cloud. The cloud then marks the device as online and
synchronizes the online state of the device to the mobile
app. The device and the cloud then maintain a heartbeat
connection to keep the device status periodically updated.
(6) Device inUse: In this phase, the device can interact with the
cloud to perform the tasks. In addition, the user can monitor
the real-time status of the device and explicitly send control
commands remotely via the mobile app.
Note that the order of steps (1) and (2) is exchangeable depending
on the concrete implementation.
2.3 Communication Model
Typically, IoT device interacts with cloud or mobile in four types
of communication channels. The channels serve for either device
control or data transmission, and operate either under crypto pro-
tection or in plaintext. We depict them in Figure 2.
(1) Remote Control:When the user’s smartphone can access
the Internet, he can remotely monitor and control his de-
vice via IoT cloud. Specifically, the mobile app sends control
commands of the target device identified by device ID to the
IoT cloud. Then the IoT cloud checks whether the user is
authorized to access this device. If the checking is passed,
the cloud forwards the command to the target device.
(2) Local Control:When the user is in the same LAN with the
device, he can directly send local control commands to the
target device. Some IoT platforms such as Ali’s Alink are
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Figure 2: IoT Device Communication Channels
exceptions because they stick to the remote control channel
even if the mobile app and the device are in the same LAN.
(3) Smart Control: The IoT cloud can automatically send con-
trol commands to the device when automation rules are
satisfied. For example, the user can edit a rule that turns on
the smart plug at a specified time if the temperature is below
70◦F. The rule is synchronized to the cloud. When the time
comes and thermometer indicates that the temperature is
below 70◦F, the cloud will automatically send a “turn on”
command to the smart plug.
(4) Data Uploading: The IoT devices typically upload three
kinds of messages (e.g., command response, heart-beat mes-
sage and event notifications) to the IoT cloud. First, the device
need to reply to the control commands to notify cloud if the
commands have been successfully executed and some com-
mands also ask the device to continually upload their sensor
data (e.g., video recording). Second, the IoT devices routinely
send heart-beat message to the cloud, thus the cloud can be
aware of the connection with the device. Note that many
platforms also include current device status into the heart-
beat message, so that the user can monitor the latest device
status remotely. Lastly, IoT devices also need to upload the
event notifications (e.g., motion detection) to the IoT cloud
so that the cloud can trigger smart control commands to the
smart home.
3 A PRELIMINARY CLASSIFICATION
We classify the collected logic bugs into seven categories based
on their root causes. In Table 1, we list the categories, the cor-
responding logic bugs, a brief description for each bug, and the
corresponding references. Note that this classification is prelimi-
nary, because with the development of IoT technologies, we expect
the emergence of previously-unseen new vulnerabilities.
Authentication Problems. Authentication is a classic issue in
systems security. IoT systems are no exception [18, 19, 26]. More
specifically, there are logic bugs in which the IoT devices are mis-
takenly recognized as other devices (bug 1 and bug 3).
Over-privileged Capabilities. Similar to Android applications,
IoT platforms also use capabilities to define and manage the priv-
ileges of the automation apps in the cloud. However, recent re-
search [8] disclosed that the automation apps are often granted
more privileges than necessary and the privileges were abused
by attackers (bug 4 and bug 5). Meanwhile, IoT devices also lack
necessary privilege separation (bug 6).
Working State Out of Synchronization. The IoT devices, mo-
bile apps and the IoT cloud interact with each other closely in IoT
platforms. A critical event will cause a working state change in
either of the three entities. Formally, the working state changes can
be modelled as a state machine. However, the state machine transi-
tions are often not properly safeguarded in popular IoT platforms.
When an unexpected transition is triggered by attackers, serious
consequence could happen (bug 7 and bug 8).
Sensor Data Out of Synchronization. Due to intermittent net-
work conditions, the delivery of sensory measurements from the
IoT devices to the IoT cloud could be interrupted or delayed. That
will make the sensory data out of synchronization between IoT
devices and the cloud. Research [15] demonstrates how attackers
can utilize this vulnerability to cause security hazards (bug 9 and
bug 10).
Unexpected Trigger Action. The trigger action model is widely
used in IoT automation apps. Researchers [15] discover several logic
bugs (bug 11-14) caused by unexpected trigger action chains.
Information Flow Hijacking in Automation APP. IoT plat-
forms allow users to install third-party trigger-action services like
IFTTT. However, as revealed in bug 15 and bug 16, attackers can
stealthily inject JavaScript code or HTML tags in malicious automa-
tion apps. This redirects the action to the server which is under the
control of attackers.
Vulnerable TaskManagement in RTOS. RTOSs are widely used
in the resource-constrained IoT devices. Some RTOSs (e.g., Arm
Mbed OS) feature task isolation for increased system security. How-
ever, researchers found that there has a serious design flaw (e.g.,
bug 16) that can be exploited to bypass this protection [2]. In addi-
tion, constrained by the capability of the hardware, no page-based
memory protection can be supported in RTOSs. Instead, the RTOS
kernel and tasks often share the same flat address space. As a result,
a simple memory error such as a buffer overflow in a vulnerable
task could corrupt the memory of another task or even the kernel.
Since this problem is not directly related to the IoT platform design
logic, we consider it as a weakness.
In the following, we detail these seven categories. In each section,
we elaborate the logic bugs from five aspects.
A System Model describes the technical background behind
this logic bug;
B Attack Scenario describes the prerequisites of the attack,
how the attackers exploit this logic bug, and the consequence
of the attack;
C Cause Analysis discusses the fundamental cause of why
this vulnerability exists;
D Identifying Method describes the method used in identi-
fying this logic bug;
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Table 1: A Preliminary Classification of IoT Logic Bugs
Category Ref Name
Authentication Problems
Section 4
Zhou19 [26] Bug 1:Weak Device Authentication
Firmalice15 [19] Bug 2: Device Authentication Bypass
Sethi19 [18] Bug 3:Weak Owner Authentication
Over-privileged Capability Management
Section 5
Fernandes16[8] Bug 4: Over-granted Capabilities in Automation Application
Fernandes [8] Bug 5: Coarse-grained Capabilities in Automation Application
Yao19 [24] Bug 6: Privilege Separation Logic Bugs in IoT Firmware
Working State Out of Synchronization
Section 6
Zhou19 [26] Bug 7: Insufficient State Guard
Zhou19 [26] Bug 8: Illegal States Combination
Sensor Data Out of Synchronization
Section 7
Ocon19 [15] Bug 9: Sensor Blinding
Ocon19 [15] Bug 10: State Confusion
Unexpected Trigger Action in Automation APP
Section 8
Celik18 [5] Bug 11: Race Conditions of Events
Celik18 [5] Bug 12: Attributes of Conflicting Values
Celik18 [5] Bug 13: Attributes Duplication
Celik18[5] Bug 14:Missing Events
Information Flow Hijacking in Automation APP
Section 9
Bastys18 [3] Bug 15: URL-based JS Injection
Bastys18 [3] Bug 16: URL-based HTML Tag Injection
Vulnerable Task Management in RTOS
Section 10
Dong19 [2] Bug 17: Lack of Isolation between Context Table and Tasks
Dong19 [2] Weakness: Inadequate Task Memory Isolation
E Defense discusses how to defend against and mitigate this
logic bug in the first place.
4 AUTHENTICATION PROBLEMS
4.1 Bug 1: Weak Device Authentication
A. System model. To manage devices and provide remote service
for users, the IoT cloud needs to perform authentication checks
on both users and devices. Comparing to developed mobile-side
user authentication, the manufacturers and IoT platform providers
deploy simple or no authentication for IoT devices. Typically, the
device-cloud communication adopts one-way SSL protocol and only
the server certificates are hard-coded in the firmware. That means
the device only authenticates the cloud/server certificate, but the
cloud cannot authenticate the device via client certificate.
Thus, to realize device authentication, some manufacturers hard-
coded the server credential, the MAC address, serial number, device
ID, etc. in the firmware. Before building a connection with the
device, the cloud will check whether the information is legitimate or
not. Other companies use their own proprietary protocol for device-
cloud communication. They usually use hard-coded communication
key or secrets used generated communication key in the firmware
for device authentication.
B. Attack Scenario. For IoT platforms using communication key
or secrets used to generate communication key for device authenti-
cation, once these keys or secrets has leaked, attackers can decrypt
the device communication traffic and carry out man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack to the devices. For IoT platforms using additional
device information including device credentials for device authen-
tication, even if such information has leaked, the attackers are still
unable to decrypt the communication. However, Zhou et al. [26]
show that attackers can leverage it to emulate non-existing devices
to log in and keep the connection with the cloud. Cloud will con-
sider it as a real device. The attackers can take advantage of that
with other logic bugs as we shall see in Section 6 to intervene in
the normal interactions of real devices.
C. Cause Analysis. The information used for device authentica-
tion should be well-protected, but actually it is readily acquired
by attackers in the real world. First, some information is publicly
available or can be easily inferred. For example, the attackers can
guess or brute-force attack device MAC address, because the first
three bytes in a MAC address are usually fixed for a manufacturer.
Thus, the adversary can fix these bytes and mutate the last 3 bytes.
In addition, some IoT platform providers like Ali allow one cre-
dential to be used by multiple device authentication. Even worse,
Zhou et al. [26] also found there are a bunch of credentials used
for Ali’s IoT device authentication that are available on the official
Github repositories of both the Ali company and the cooperative
manufacturers.
Some other information like communication keys makes a brute-
force guessing to them impossible. However, such information is
usually hard-coded and cannot be changed once it is programmed.
Thus, once the attackers have physical access to the victim device,
such information become leaked forever. Furthermore, compared
to PC and mobile phone, there are more circumstances in which a
victim use a device which was once possessed by an attacker. First,
the consumer ownership of a device can be changed if the device
gets resold or decommissioned. Second, the smart home device can
be shared with others in many scenarios such as vacation rentals
and hospitality services like Airbnb. In both cases, the attackers
have a chance to extract device authentication information from
the device.
D. Identifying Method & Defense. The IoT platform should de-
ploy strict device authentication mechanisms. Depending on the
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computation capability of the device, for high-end IoT devices pow-
ered by high-end CPU like ARM Cortex-A, the unique client cer-
tificate should be encrypted and stored into the One Time Pro-
grammable (OTP) register rather than firmware. The cloud should
adopt two-way SSL authentication and always check the client
certificate. For resource-restricted IoT devices, the manufacturer
should embed a read-only random number into the device. The
cloud should always check whether the random number matches
other unique device information like MAC address.
4.2 Bug 2: Device Authentication Bypass
A. System model. In this system model, we consider the authenti-
cation bypass vulnerability only in the IoT device itself, and it has
nothing to do with the IoT Platform as mentioned in Section 2.1.
These IoT devices provide a mini web server or a customized server
with a listening port that allows users to access and control the
device through a web browser or directly through the listening
port. Certainly, some sensitive operations of IoT devices can only
be performed by authorized users. Taking a network camera as
an example, only authorized users have permission to watch the
recorded video and change the recording settings. Thus, IoT devices
protect these privileged operations through user verification. The
typical verification mechanism is to check the username and pass-
word stored in IoT devices. Before the user can operate the device,
a pair of username and password will be required. Then, the device
performs authorization verification by comparing the credentials
stored in the device with the password provided by the user. Such
an authentication process is implemented in the firmware of the
device.
B. Attack Scenario. Authentication bypass vulnerability, com-
monly termed “backdoors”, allows an attacker to execute privileged
functionalities (e.g., password modification, video downloads, and
firmware upgrades, etc.) without knowing the valid credentials
of an authorized user. For example, Santamarta presented a back-
door attack to the Schneider ION 8600 smart meter at BlackHat
in 2012 [16]. He found a Factory Login account as “reserved” by
reading the meter’s documents. Then, he reverse-engineers the
firmware of the smart meter and discovered a factory login account
that allows an attacker to fully control the device. This account is
a 32-bit number that could be computed using a hash algorithm
seeded with a hard-coded “secret” string and the serial number of
the smart meter. Therefore, an attacker can access the smart me-
ter via telnet to obtain the serial number and generate the factory
login account. Then, the attacker can use this account to modify
protected data such as billing.
C. Cause Analysis. There are three reasons for the authentication
bypass bug. The first reason is the intentionally hard-coded creden-
tials. Some manufacturers hard-coded credentials that are unknown
to the user for device maintenance and upgrade. For example, the
backdoor in the smart meter is a hard-coded credential. The second
reason is the intentionally hidden authentication interface. Such
interfaces do not require authorization to access the privileged op-
erations in IoT devices. The third reason is that the unintended bugs
compromise the integrity of the authentication routine or bypass it
entirely.
D. Identifying Method & Defense. Shoshitaishvili et al. have
presented Firmalice [19], a binary firmware analysis framework to
discover the authentication bypass bug. First, Firmalice converts the
firmware binary to an intermediate language called VEX, discovers
the entry point and identifies privileged program points. Then,
Firmalice uses code slicing techniques to extract code snippets
associated with the privileged program point, relieving symbolic
execution path explosion problems. Finally, Firmalice performs
symbolic execution on the sliced code and attempts to solve the
path constraints at the privileged point to concretize the user input.
If the user input can be uniquely concretized, then it represents
that the input required to reach the privileged program point can
be uniquely determined by the attacker, and the associated path
is labeled as an authentication bypass. Since most authentication
bypass bugs in IoT devices are backdoors that deliberately left by
firmware developers, we think the best defense is to patch and
upgrade the firmware by discovering authentication bypass early
through program analysis techniques (e.g., Firmalice).
4.3 Bug 3: Weak Owner Authentication
A. System model. Some IoT device manufacturers do not deploy
their devices with IoT platform, so that they have to adopt other
protocols like Nimble out-of-band authentication for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP-NOOB) to implement bootstrapping
of new devices.
For EAP-NOOB protocol, a human-assisted-out-of-bind (OOB)
channel is added to achieve device binding process. Specifically,
when a user wants to bind the device, he first needs to deliver
his user authentication message to the device in an OOB channel.
The form of user authentication message could be QR code, audio
signal, NFC data, etc. Then the device transmits user authentication
message to the cloud with its identity information, finally the cloud
can bind this device with the user’s account. For example, when
the user binds the camera, the IoT cloud will generate a QR code
associated with his account and send it to user’s mobile app. Then
user should let the camera scan the QR code to complete the device
binding process.
B. Attack Scenario.We show a specific attack scenario in Figure 3.
The user first resets the device to activate the device registration. At
the same time, the attacker also activates the registration of device
B. After that, the user logs in his account and choose the camera A,
and the QR code encoding as authenticationmessages are generated
from the cloud. Then, the user shows the QR code to the camera A
(in the OOB channel indicated by the dashed line in Figure 3). Since
the device A is compromised and controlled, the attacker would
deliver the message received by the device A to another device B.
With the authentication message, the attacker successfully binds
the camera B to the user’s account. As a result, the device B owns
authentication message and would be successfully associated with
the user’s account on the IoT cloud which is against the user’s
intention. Researchers [18] call this attack as misbinding attack.
C. Cause Analysis. In the IoT device bootstrapping process, the
IoT cloud lacks adequate authentication of target IoT device which
causes this logic bug. Specifically, the IoT cloud associates the user’s
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Figure 3: Attack Scenario of Bug 3
account with the IoT device which provides the user’s authenti-
cation message generated by the mobile app. Once the target IoT
device is compromised, the information could be stolen by the
attacker and used for another device binding.
In addition, IoT devices take user’s physical access to devices
as their identities instead of cryptographically verifiable identities
such as serial number, public keys, which makes it hard for the IoT
cloud to authenticate the IoT device.
D. Identifying Method. To analyze an authentication protocol
whether this logic bug exists or not in it, Sethi et al. [18] have pro-
posed a formal model analysis approach based on an automatic
cryptographic protocol verifier named Proverif. This analysis ap-
proach finally finds two forms of misbinding. One is shown in the
attack scenario, and another is that both devices are compromised
and the bug could be exploited similarly.
E. Defense. Approaches such as identifier communication and
presence checking have been proposed by Sethi et al. [18] to par-
tially defend the attacks. In the identifier communication approach,
the IoT cloud utilizes some printable information such as model,
serial numbers and even public-key fingerprint attached to the de-
vice for enhancing device authentication. Thus, it would be more
difficult for attackers to launch the misbinding attack. In the pres-
ence checking approach, the user always communicates with the
dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) inside the device
and generates authentication approaches based on trust computing
base (TCB), which could check the presence of the device correctly
even with untrusted software in the IoT device.
5 OVER-PRIVILEGED CAPABILITIES
MANAGEMENT
5.1 System Model
Recently, many IoT platform providers open their automation ap-
plication programming frameworks to support third party IoT apps
development. These programming frameworks usually define a set
of capabilities to manage the permissions of IoT apps. A capability
in the IoT platform consists of a set of commands (i.e., method calls)
and attributes (i.e., properties) [8]. Commands represent ways in
which a device can be controlled. Attributes represent the state
information of a device. When installing an automation application
in the IoT platform, the user would be asked to authorize what ca-
pabilities to this application. Once it is installed, the application can
send commands and obtain attributes to/from the related devices,
bound with these capabilities.
5.2 Bug 4: Over-granted Capabilities in
Automation Apps
A. Attack Scenario. A malicious automation application adver-
tises itself as a battery status monitor application. However, it
requests a set of capabilities which is beyond the requirements
of a battery status monitor application, including capability.lock
and capability.unlock. When being installed into the system, this
application is authorized the capabilities of monitoring the battery
status of the front door lock as well as locking and unlocking it.
As a result, this automation application can secretly unlock the
door without the user’s attention. Hence, it puts the user under the
threat of break-ins and theft.
B. Cause Analysis. An automation application can request capa-
bilities beyond what its advertisement describes. However, from
the description, the user usually has no knowledge of what capa-
bilities can be abused when he chooses to install the automation
application. The root cause of this bug is the gap between what
capabilities would be used in the user’s mind and the reality of
what capabilities can be used.
C. Identifying Method & Defense. Tian et al. proposed a tool,
SmartAuth, identifying the automation application which requests
more capabilities and has more functionalities than its advertis-
ing [21]. It collects security-relevant information from the automa-
tion application’s description, code and annotations, and identifies
discrepancies between what is claimed in the description and what
the app actually does. Then the information is used to inform the
user how the specific application has the inconsistency between its
description and its code. Therefore, the users have the knowledge
to determine whether the automation application can abuse cer-
tain capabilities and enforce whether the automation application
can utilize certain capabilities with SmartAuth through different
security policies. Because most IoT platforms are closed-source,
SmartAuth patches the automation application to implement the
proof-of-concept system. In the end, each automation application
can only access what the user allows.
5.3 Bug 5: Coarse-grained Capabilities in
Automation Apps
A. Attack Scenario.When being installed into the IoT platform, a
benign-but-buggy or malicious automation application requests to
use only one command lock of capability.lock. Because of the coarse-
grained capabilities in the platform, this capability also includes
command unlock. That means the automation application has the
ability to automatically send unlock command. If this capability is
bound to a front door lock, this automation application can lock
and unlock the front door. Hence, when this benign-but-buggy or
malicious automation application is exploited by an attacker, she
can unlock the front door, which can result in break-ins or theft.
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B. CauseAnalysis. The root cause of this bug is the coarse-grained
capabilities classification in the automation application program-
ming frameworks. One capability may include one or more com-
mands and attributes. Once an automation application requests one
command, a set of other commands or attributes included in one
capability are also authorized to this app automatically.
C. Identifying Method. The method of identifying whether an
automation application has been authorized more commands or
attributes than it requires is to verify the result of requested com-
mands and attributes - used commands and attributes. If it is empty,
automation application is not over-privileged. The requested com-
mands and attributes can be directly obtained from the capabilities
requested by the automation application. To get the used commands
and attributes, Fernandes et al. utilize static analysis to determine a
list of all methods and properties accessed in an automation appli-
cation [8]. Then this list is filtered using the completed capability
documentation to obtain the set of used commands and attributes
in this app. In the end, the set of over-authorized commands or
attributes can be computed.
D. Defense. The root cause is essentially the design flaw of the
IoT platform. Therefore, to defend the attacks caused by the coarse-
grained capabilities, the design of this system should be re-constructed.
However, most IoT platforms are closed-source. Moreover, the cost
of using a new design may be huge because of deployed devices and
applications. Taking this into consideration, patching the automa-
tion application could be the only solution to defend this kind of
attack. Jia et al. propose ContextIoT, which can automatically patch
unmodified commodity automation application, to provide fine-
grained capabilities in the IoT platform [11]. ContextIoT consists of
two major steps at two stages, e.g., installation time and runtime.
At the installation time, ContextIoT collects context information
from the automation application and patches it to separate secu-
rity sensitive behaviors (e.g., unlock) which request permissions
from the user, if the context is not logical. At runtime, ContextIoT
prompts the request to the user to ask for permission if the behavior
does not conform with a certain security logic. Essentially, Contex-
tIoT prevents the usage of capabilities authorized to an automation
application for malicious behaviors.
5.4 Bug 6: Privilege Separation Logic Bugs in
IoT Firmware
A. SystemModel. IoT devices continuously interact with different
entities including mobile automation application, cloud or physical
access (e.g., pushing a button) and perform the tasks corresponding
to the user commands. As shown in Figure 4, because different
communication channels usually use different protocols, ports and
servers, the IoT firmware images are implemented with different
functions to receive and decode the message from different interac-
tive entities. We name the first function used to receive the message
from interactive entities as caller functions. After decoding the
message, IoT firmware images invoke other functions to extract
the commands and finally trigger the corresponding functions to
accomplish the specific tasks. We name the first function used to
perform tasks for individual command as task function.
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Figure 5: Attack Scenario of Bug 5
In addition, since different entities play distinct roles in an IoT
platform, the command sets from these diverse interactive entities
are differential. That means some commands could only be invoked
by specific interactive entities in normal operations. For instance,
remote commands sent by the cloud are usually responsible for
device management services like assigning device identification.
Thus, most functions in IoT firmware can be divided into separated
collections for dealing with commands invoked by different entities.
Each collection should have distinct privilege, so that one entity
can only invoke its own commands. For example, according to the
privilege separation rules in Figure 4, Task function B should only
be invoked by command B sent by mobile app and Task function C
should only be invoked by command C sent by cloud and so on.
B. Attack Scenario. As shown in Figure 5, a legitimate user is the
ownership of a smart lock with the device ID A, and an attacker
owns another IoT device with the device ID B. At this point, if
the attacker has access to the same local network with the user’s
device, he is able to send a set_device_id command to the smart
lock, changing the device ID of the smart lock from A to B which
has been bound with the attacker’s account as revealed in recent
research [24].
Since the device ID is used to uniquely identify the device and the
IoT platform uses it to maintain the binding relationship between
device and owner. Once the device ID of the device has changed,
the ownership of this device will be shifted with it. Thus, in the
above attack scenario, after the device ID of the smart lock had
been changed as B, the attacker can illegally occupy this device
forever.
C. Cause Analysis. In the above attack example, the command
set_device_id which should only be sent by the remote IoT cloud
has been accidentally carried out by a local attacker. The root cause
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of that is the developers use common functions to deal with com-
mand sets belong to various interactive entities in real-world IoT
firmware.
Due to these common functions, IoT firmware images often
contain various execution paths from caller functions of different
interactive entities but finally to the same task function. As shown
in Figure 4, if IoT firmware uses the same function to extract com-
mands from mobile app and cloud, except for the normal execution
path from caller function 2 to task function C, there also exists an
unexpected execution path from caller function 1 to task function
C. That violates the privilege separation rules. Thus, the local at-
tackers are able to perform some remote sensitive command C (e.g.,
setting device ID or unbinding the devices) which should only be
sent by cloud. Such unexpected execution paths are called privilege
separation vulnerabilities in paper [24].
D. Identifying Method. Based on the root cause of the attack,
the key to identify privilege separation vulnerabilities is to iden-
tify the over-privileged common functions which will be used for
performing one command but could be invoked by different inter-
active entities. Yao et al. [24] developed a useful tool to identify the
over-privileged common function according to the path constraints
generated by symbolic execution.
E. Defense. The strict privilege separation model should be
implemented in IoT firmware to make the control flow and data
flow of handling commands sent by different interactive entities
strictly separated.
6 WORKING STATE OUT OF
SYNCHRONIZATION
6.1 System Model
Before the IoT devices can be securely used in a smart home, three
entities (i.e., the device, mobile app, and IoT cloud) involved in the
IoT platform need to go through several setup steps (e.g., device
discovery, device registration, device binding, etc. as mentioned in
Section 2.2). The three entities in different steps must stay in a legal
working state or state combinations. In an ideal situation, different
steps should be invoked when three entities in a different specific
working state. For instance, the device login request should only be
IoT Devices
Keep
Connection
Attacker
Device 
Binding
Victim
Device UnbindingIoT 
Cloud
Figure 7: Attack Scenario of Bug 7
sent when the cloud has already accepted device binding request
but the device has not built the connection with cloud.
In addition, the interactions between three entities will cause
a transition of their working states. Thus, the working states of
each entity are not independent but closely related to each other.
That means an interaction may cause the working state of three
entities to change altogether. For example, in normal operations, if
a user does not want to use his device, he should reset and unbind
the device. IoT cloud will revoke the ownership of original and
disconnect with the device. The working state of three entities will
go back to their initial state at the same time. After that, if anyone
wants to re-use the device, the three entities need to go through
a complete setup process, including local device discovery, device
binding, and device login.
6.2 Attack Scenario
Bug 7: Insufficient StateGuard.As shown in Figure 6, an automa-
tion app has a home automation rule that connects a fire alarm
and a smart lock, so that in case of a fire, the alarm can detect
thick smoke and send a command to the smart lock to open the
door. However, Zhou et al. [26] found the attacker is able to log in
a phantom device the has the same device identity as the smoke
alarm. Then the attacker can send fake smoke alarms via phantom
device to the IoT cloud. As a result, the cloud will also unlock the
door allowing the attacker to enter the room.
Bug 8: Illegal States Combination. If a user only unbinds the
device but forgets to reset the device, the IoT cloud will also revoke
the ownership with the user, but the device is still in its original state
and keeps a connection with the IoT cloud. This allows a remote
attacker to forge and send a binding request with his account to
cloud at that moment as shown in Figure 7. Since the connection
between cloud and device is still maintained, after the cloud accepts
the binding request, the victim’s device will be directly under the
control of the remote attacker without finishing other setup steps
including device discovery or logging in the cloud.
6.3 Cause Analysis
In the bug 7 exploitation example, the IoT cloud not only just does
not carry out strict device authentication, more importantly, IoT
cloud accepts device requests without checking its working state.
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Thus, even if IoT cloud fails to distinguish the real device with
the phantom device, as long as it is aware that the same device is
still keeping the connection, it should still refuse the same device
login request based on its current working state. Unfortunately,
many popular IoT platforms do not maintain the working state of
interactive entities. That means most requests can be invoked at
any time, which will lead the inconsistency in the IoT cloud. This
inconsistency could further be taken advantage of, causing serious
security and privacy violations.
In the bug 8 exploitation scenario, when the cloud accepts the
unbinding request, it, together with the mobile app will go back to
the initial state but the working state of the device has not been
changed. Thus, the cloud will allow the device binding request and
directly transfer to the normal working state, even if the real device
has not ever been set.
6.4 Identifying Method
The legitimate interaction between the three kinds of entities can
be clearly represented by a working state machine and the legiti-
mate 3-tuple state combinations of three entities can also be clearly
identified according to normal operations. Then, according to the
transition rules, unexpected interaction requests which should not
happen in its current working state and unexpected state combina-
tions can be easily identified.
6.5 Defense
To prevent the three entities from accepting unexpected interaction
requests, each entity should add the working state field in each
communication message. As such, the sender and receiver entity
can verify if its current state allows the request to be sent out or
accepted.
On the other hand, in case three entities stay out of the legitimate
state combinations, the IoT cloud of a platform should be responsi-
ble for synchronizing the three entities to ensure that three entities
always remain in a legitimate state combination. Since intermittent
network conditions may make it difficult to keep the three entities’
working state synchronized at all time, as an alternative solution,
the handshake protocol can be used for state synchronization. If an
unexpected state combination occurs, the three entities should roll
back to their previous legitimate state combination immediately.
7 SENSOR DATA OUT OF
SYNCHRONIZATION
7.1 System Model
As mentioned in Section 2.3, corresponding to three kinds of device
uploading message, communication between the IoT cloud and
device can be divided into three sub-channels. It is a common
practice the three sub-channels are separated on that the protocols,
transport layer ports, servers, or time-shared on the same network
flow. In addition, the heart-beat message and event notifications
are low-bandwidth messages, and the content messages are high-
bandwidth messages. As shown in Figure 8, heart-beat messages
are used for checking the availability of the device, so that this sub-
channel is always-responsive. Correspondingly, content messages
used for command responses and event notifications are on-demand.
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Figure 8: System Model of Bug 9 and 10
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Note that sensor data mentioned in this system model not only
represents the sensory measurements which are the data collected
by sensors, including motion detection, video recording, auditory,
water detection, or other environmental sensors, but also includes
the actuator states which are the physical status of devices (e.g.
smart-lock with the locked or unlocked state).
7.2 Attack Scenario
An attacker can exploit the out-sync of sensor data to cause sensor
blinding or state confusion [15]. Sensor blinding attack could de-
stroy the availability of sensor devices by preventing the delivery
of sensory measurements to the IoT cloud. State confusion attacks
the integrity of actuator state of devices reported to IoT cloud, and
causes the state displayed in the companion mobile app to be in-
consistent with the actual state of the actuator. We assume that
the attackers can fingerprint the IoT devices being used and learn
the telemetry channel model for a specific device, they can also
selectively suppress a particular channel in the following attack
scenarios. Attackers can achieve this by physical layer suppression
(e.g. jamming) and local network layer suppression (e.g. controlling
over the wireless router).
Bug 9: Sensor Blinding. As a concrete example mentioned in pa-
per [15], the Merkury Security Camera is a connected surveillance
camera that is able to record abnormal motions such as home in-
vasion, and uploads motion notification to AWS servers using a
plain-text MQTT connection. Meanwhile, the device separately
sends heartbeats (connectivity health and video content) to the
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AWS servers over SSL. Attackers can easily identify the always-
responsive and on-demand messages by correlating the packet
timings and blind the sensor from delivering abnormal messages.
The server regards the device as online because it receives the peri-
odic heartbeats, but it will not be aware the device fails to report
on-demand messages. Thus, the companion mobile app will not
alert the user for the abnormal event even though the device upload
videos over the SSL connection. Because the device does not buffer
undelivered events if it is not disconnected, users will not get a
notification even after connection reconstruction. Attackers can
utilize this logic bug to eliminate forensic evidence to gain physical
access to areas.
Bug 10: State Confusion. In another attack scenario [15], the
author discovered state confusion in the Schlage Deadbolt. The
Schlage Deadbolt offers Z-Wave connectivity and supports different
hubs including SmartThings, Iris, Alexa, etc. After the deadbolt and
the hub are paired, the user can remotely control and monitor the
state of the deadbolt through the mobile app. The author found that
the on-demand channel packets were quite larger than the always-
responsive heartbeatmessages. Figure 9 describes an attack scenario
when the deadbolt works with SmartThings hub. An attacker could
drop packets larger than 359 bytes for the SmartThings hub by
local network layer suppression to prevent the transmission of
unlocked state change when the deadbolt triggers an unlocked
event. After stopping the suppression, the companion mobile app
reported the deadbolt as locked. However, after a maximum period
(e.g., 100 seconds) of heart-beat messages, the companion mobile
app updated the state as unlocked. Another, when the deadbolt
works with the Iris hub, the attacker could suppress the on-demand
channel and drop packets larger than 250 bytes. In this scenario,
the Iris hub’s companion mobile app has always falsely reported
the deadbolt as locked. So for SmartThings hub, an attacker can use
this short 100 seconds state confusion to sneak into the house. And
for Iris hub, the serious thing is that the attack would permanently
confuse the mobile app.
7.3 Cause Analysis
The sensor data out of synchronization is due to packet loss and
delay in the telemetry channel. There are two main reasons for
packet loss and delay. First, the IoT device’s limited storage and
battery constraints feature cause a lack of on-demand event buffer-
ing and lengthy timeout periods. Second, when an adversary sup-
presses on-demand messages and causes disconnection, the IoT
device typically are designed to re-establish the connection by
always-responsive sub-channel and discards the event instead of
re-sending the buffered event notification.
Furthermore, there have another special reason for state con-
fusion. IoT platform treats a state change as a single fixed event
and only also devices to report the state change when the action
physically occurred.
7.4 Defenses
There are three main methods to defend against telemetry channel
suppression attacks in IoT [15]. The first method to defend against
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Figure 10: System Model of Bug 11-14
the attack is to obscure messages sent from the devices by manip-
ulating traffic. Another method is to establish pre-IoT virtual pri-
vate networks to prevent attackers from inferring traffic activities
and selectively suppressing the on-demand sub-channels. Besides,
unifying the on-demand and always responsive sub-channels, re-
designing priority buffer scheme, and reducing timeout length to
achieve a secure IoT design are great solutions for this logic bug.
8 UNEXPECTED TRIGGER ACTION IN
AUTOMATION APPLICATION
8.1 System Model
The automation app developments are based on a software stack
provided by IoT platforms to realize monitoring and controlling on
IoT devices ∗. Under the hood, as shown in Figure 10, the trigger-
action model of the IoT platform consists of events, event-handler
methods of automation app, actions, and the attributes which rep-
resent the state information of devices. To realize the trigger-action
services, the automation app needs to register an event-handler
with a device event or pre-defined event. The handlers are trig-
gered to take action when these events occur. Actions represent
the commands to control device states, which cause modifications
on attributes, e.g., device state changes.
By exploiting the logic flows of the trigger-action rules, several
critical bugs have been disclosed by Celik et al. [5], In what follows,
we introduce four representative bugs in this category.
8.2 Bug 11: Race Conditions of Events
A. Attack Scenario. As is defined in [5], an attribute of a de-
vice cannot be modified to conflicting values by two or more non-
complementary event handlers of multiple apps working in concert,
which may lead to a potential race condition. For example, “When
motion is detected, turn on the switch” and “Every day at midnight,
turn off the switch” will conflict if motion is detected at 12 pm.
It is notable that the authors [5] do not investigate what attacks
the adversary may realize by utilizing these bugs. Thus, the conse-
quences caused by this bug are limited to leading devices trapped
into insecure or unsafe states.
∗All the unexpected trigger-action bugs covered in this section lie in Samsung’s Smart-
Things Platform
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B. Cause Analysis. Upon its subscribed events’ occurrence which
is different from each other, two ormore independent event-handlers
of multiple apps are invoked to take actions possibly at the same
time to manipulate the same attribute of one device to conflicting
values. The sequence and timing of actions of these event-handlers
usually make the final states of devices unpredictable.
C. Identifying Method.
The authors who discovered the above logic bug also proposed
the identifying method named SOTERIA [5]. This approach trans-
lates the source code of an automation app into an intermediate
representation (IR) at its initial phase. With the IR being fed into
the second phase, a state model of the app including its states and
transitions is constructed. For the third phase, a series of IoT prop-
erties are identified for further security analysis. Property S.4 states
this race condition of events bug [5]. Model checking is performed
to find the existence of property violations when the app function-
ing independently or working collectively with other apps. S.4 is
violated during the interaction between multiple apps by invoking
actions with different device events which manipulate the same
attribute of the dedicated device to conflicting values [5].
D. Defense. IoTGuard [6] is a follow-up work that enforces a policy
checker on a dedicated server. It is comprised of three components:
a code instrumentor, a data collector, and security service. The code
instrumentor provides two functions by adding extra logic to an
app’s source code. One is to collect runtime information including
the app’s actions, the event to trigger the action, the condition
to be satisfied for the action, and the involved numerical-valued
attributes, followed by sending the collected action’s information
to the data collector. The other one is to insert a guard, essentially
waiting for a decision from the security service on the action to be
taken.
The data collector receives all the actions’ information from the
instrumented app when its event-handler gets invoked, which are
loaded into the dynamic model. The design of this dynamic model
is to emulate the logic of either an app execution not interacting
with other apps or unified interaction of multiple apps before an
action for further security service evaluation.
The security service is based on identified policies which are
extensions of IoT properties [5]. The policy enforcement is actually
enforcing the dynamic model to conform to the established policies.
For the race condition of events, users are required to choose which
action to be blocked since the nature of this bug is conflicting values
of the same attribute. The decision is fed into the above guard to
continue app execution, which successfully prevents the device
from being stuck into unsafe and undesired states [6].
8.3 Bug 12: Attributes of Conflicting Values
A. Attack Scenario. In a scenario where multiple automation apps
are used in combination, multiple apps may change an attribute
of the device to conflicting values based on the same event. For
example, App1 sounds the smoke alarm and turns on the light when
the smoke is detected, and App2 turns off a light switch when the
smoke is detected. In this case, there will be unpredictable results,
that is, the light may be on or maybe off.
B. Cause Analysis. There are two major causes of this logic bug.
First, multiple apps share the same device attributes, and different
apps use the same event. Second, app designers are limited to con-
sidering a single app’s program logic, and it is hard to think of the
global logic in a mixed-use scenario of multiple apps.
C. Identifying Method & Defense. Identifying methods and de-
fense methods are similar to Section 8.2. For multi-apps, SOTERIA
builds a union state model. SOTERIA uses a safety property to iden-
tify the attributes of conflicting values. The property states that
a handler must not change attributes to conflicting values on the
same event in multi-apps. If an app does not conform to this prop-
erty when running interacting with other apps, the multi-apps have
attributes of conflicting values bug. Similarly, IoTGuard uses secu-
rity service to defend against this logic bug. The security service is
the same as the safety property mentioned above.
8.4 Bug 13: Attributes Duplication
A. Attack Scenario. The duplication of an attribute can be invoked
by the same or different event handlers. When one IoT device
receives the duplicate attributes, it may cause unexpected results. As
an example mentioned in [22], App1 calls users when their calendar
receives an appointment, while App2 adds a new appointment in
the user’s calendar if they missed a call. Hence, if one call is missed,
there will be pointless appointments filled in the user’s calendar. If
the triggers of one attribute are two complement event handlers, it
will be a special case of an inconsistent event. For example, App1
opens a device when the motion event handler is active, while App2
is designed to open the device when the same handler is inactive. It
happens when multiple applications control one device. Since there
is no agreement on the logic design between different applications,
they might utilize a device in the same way with divergent event
handlers.
B. Cause Analysis. Two circumstances can trigger attributes du-
plication. First, this logic bug happens when multiple apps interact
with the same device. Developers may publish applications control-
ling the same devices with different goals. Thus, an event handler
updates cyclically one device with the same attributes. Second,
some apps use general event handlers instead of a specific sub-
event handler, such as Turn off all devices vs. Turn off the device
or Disarm all cameras vs. Disarm a camera. So the general event
handlers will update all corresponding attributes. Thus, one device
controlled by the general event handlers and its sub-event handlers
may receive duplicated attributes.
C. Identifying Method & Defense. Identifying methods and de-
fense methods are similar to Section 8.2. The identifying method
of this logic bug is to create a union state-model of interacting
apps. By extracting the complete behaviors when running the mul-
tiple apps, we can identify the attributes duplication. An attribute
cannot be changed repeatedly to the same value by the same or
different event handlers. If one app violates this property, it has the
attributes duplication bug. To defend against this logic bug, when
multiple apps implement the same functionality by changing one
attribute to the same values, the data collector adds parallel edges
from the event state to the action state and labels the edges with the
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app’s objects. In this case, a policy is defined by security to prevent
repeated action.
8.5 Bug 14: Missing Events
A. Attack Scenario.Under the trigger-action model of the automa-
tion app programming framework, an event must be subscribed by
the event handler whose code contains logic that handles that event.
However, if (1) a handler takes an event-type value but performs
different actions according to the types of events, or (2) the handler
has a case for handling event, but the app does not declare that
the handler subscribes to the event, the expected action cannot be
taken. For example, a smart lock app is supposed to unlock the door
when the user approaches it and lock it when the user is away. This
requires the app to subscribe to the location mode change event
handler. If this is not done, the app would fail to function.
B. Cause Analysis. This bug roots in the fact that the developers
often do not strictly follow the programming paradigm in the smart
home development.
C. Identifying Method. The bug is disclosed by using the same
methodology as described in Section 8.2. Concretely, from the ex-
tracted state model, if an event is found to have zero subscribers, it
is likely to be a missing events vulnerability.
D. Defense. To avoid this from happening, on the one hand, de-
velopers should be trained to understand the basic model of smart
home programming and follow the best practice. On the other hand,
currently, defenses including IoTGuard are very ineffective because
no general policies can be programmed as part of the security ser-
vice – no defense can be enforced when no action is requested at
all.
9 INFORMATION FLOW HIJACKING IN
AUTOMATION APPLICATION
9.1 System Model
To provide more home automation apps for user, most IoT platforms
allow the user install the automation applications from the third-
party trigger-action services and one of most popular is IFTTT.
The automation apps in IFTTT service app market named applets.
One applets is consist of three major components (trigger service,
action serivce and filter code). The triggers and actions of IFTTT
applets can be provided by different partners’ services. Between the
trigger and the action, there is filter code, which is JavaScript code
snippets. It can use the APIs provided by the partners’ services and
customize the output of the applets. For example, the filter code
can obtain and customize the URLs generated by the IFTTT cloud
service for the uploaded data from the trigger service. Then the
URLs will be passed to the action service.
9.2 Attack Scenario
Bug 15: URL-Based JS Injection. A malicious applet advertises
itself as a photo backup tool, which back ups iOS photos to Google
Drive. As long as the photo is taken, it is uploaded to the IFTTT
cloud and a URL is generated for this photo, which would be ac-
cessed by the action code of Google Drive to retrieve the photo.
However, in the filter code of this applet, there is a malicious
JavaScript code snippet, which manipulates the URL of the up-
loaded photo. The manipulated URL links to the attacker-controlled
server and includes the original URL as a parameter part. When
the URL is accessed by the action code from Google Drive, the
attacker-controlled server will be accessed. In the end, it can get the
photo through the URL in the parameter part, and send the photo
to Google Drive without the user’s attention.
Bug 16: URL-Based HTML Tag Injection A malicious applet
advertises itself as a notes-to-email tool, which records a list of
notes to the user’s email. The notes can be taken through Google
Assistant, etc. When a note is taken, the filter code of the malicious
applet injects an invisible HTML markup tag, with a URL linking to
the attacker-controlled server, into the note. The URL includes the
note content. As soon as the email is read by the user, the attacker-
controlled server would be accessed with the note content as a part
of the URL, which results in the privacy leakage.
9.3 Cause Analysis
The root cause of this problem is IFTTT service does not prevent
the information flow from the private source to public sinks. That is,
the information from the private source should not go to arbitrary
public places. For example, in the above example, the photo should
not go out of iOS system, IFTTT cloud and Google Drive. However,
without the restriction, the malicious applet can send the URL of
the photo generated by the IFTTT service to other servers, which
results in the leakage of the private information.
9.4 Identifying Method & Defense
Bastys et al. propose two solutions to defend the attacks caused
by the URL-based information flow in IFTTT service, breaking the
flow and tracking the flow [3]. Breaking the flow means to classify
the trigger and action service providers, and restrict the sources
and sinks to either exclusively private or exclusively public data. In
this way, there is no flow from private to public, thus preventing
privacy leakage. Specifically, the access to public URLs in the filter
code is disabled or delegating the choice to the users at the time of
the applet’s installation. However, both methods for breaking the
flow may over-kill the benign applets and is not flexible for future
service features. On the other hand, tracking the flow ensures the
only way to include links or markup on the action-based APIs is
through using API constructors provided by IFTTT service. By
monitoring the information flow in the applet, this method can
prevent privacy leakage and eliminate the defects in breaking the
flow method.
10 VULNERABLE TASK MANAGEMENT IN
RTOS
10.1 Bug 17: Lack of Isolation between Context
Table and Tasks
A. System Model. Arm Mbed, a representative commercial RTOS
for IoT devices, designs uVisor [13] for task sandboxing. The Mem-
ory Management Service (MMS) offered by uVisor always runs in
the privileged mode while the Task Management Service (TMS)
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Figure 12: Attack Scenario of Bug 17
offered by Mbed and all tasks (including both sandboxed and un-
sandboxed tasks) run in the unprivileged mode. The Context Table,
which holds a set of address pointers pointing to particular memory
management functions in MMS, is used by the TMS to index the
“services” provided by the MMS. The Mbed task sandboxing mecha-
nism ensures that the data of every sandboxed task will be stored
in memory and only accessible in the privileged mode, and that the
memory access permission can only be switched by the MMS. As
an example of TMS, the task scheduler is finding the ready-to-start
task shown in Figure 11. Were it to be a sandboxed task, the task
scheduler uses pre-defined SVC calls to trigger SVC dispatcher to
run in the privileged mode. The dispatcher then searches the con-
text table to call MMS, which configures the MPU to set the memory
region of the task’s data with readable/writable permissions in the
unprivileged mode. Finally, the dispatcher uses specific instructions
(e.g., load EXC_RETURN into the PC register in Cortex-M proces-
sors) to return to the unprivileged mode and gives control to the
sandboxed task.
B. Attack Scenario. There are two tasks shown in Figure 12, the
sandboxed task X with its secure data and the unsandboxed task
Y. When task X runs, an attacker controls a specific task (i.e., task
Y) to manipulate the context table to replace one of its pointers
with one of task Y’s functions to access the secure data. Then every
time the dispatcher searches the context table to call a memory
management service during task scheduling, it actually calls the
(malicious) function in task Y. Because the dispatcher hasn’t used
Vul. Function 1
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Input Strings
Nor. Function 2
3. Return
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Task Y
Task X
2. Stack Overlap
Entry of Func 2
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Figure 13: Attack Scenario of Weakness 1
instruction EXC_RETURN yet, task Y will run in the privileged
mode and gain the permission to access the secure data. After that
task Y can continue to call the intended memory management
service to make sure that the malicious behavior is non-perceived.
C. Cause Analysis. The IoT devices vulnerable to attacks exploit-
ing Bug 16 only support two privileged modes (e.g., privileged and
unprivileged modes). The TMS and tasks both run at the same privi-
lege level and there’s no mechanism to restrict tasks’ accessibility to
TMS, so the system actually cannot prevent its tasks from directly
modifying the context table in TMS, which means that only when
the context table is isolated from tasks can the system be secured.
This vulnerability is first reported in paper [2].
D. Identifying Method. To identify if the system is in the risk
of MMS hijacking attack, an improved identification technique
with control flow matching [23] is proposed here. The system de-
signer first registers original control flow of MMS by either static
or dynamic analysis methods [9, 17]. Then the software codes are
instrumented for OS to dynamically collect the control flow. When
an unexpected input is captured by the system, which manipulates
a task accesses sandboxed data with an unregistered control flow
of MMS, it will be identified and considered as hijacking the MMS.
E. Defense. LIPS [2] provides protection domains for RTOS ser-
vices and tasks under the same privileged level to achieve an intra-
privilege isolation, so that context table cannot be modified by tasks.
LIPS is incorporated into uVisor to not only keep its security but
also achieve the dynamic switching of tasks’ memory accesses.
10.2 Weakness 1: Inadequate Task Memory
Isolation
A. System Model. In x86 processors, every task could run in an
isolated virtual memory address space offered by the virtual-to-
physical address translation of MMU. Through mechanisms such as
Inter-Process Communication (IPC) and shared memory, tasks can
exchange information but still be restricted to their own address
spaces. Since the MPU does not support virtual memory, the RTOSs
deployed on IoT devices simply layout (the code and data of) tasks
into a (shared) physical memory address space, which makes the
memory address space a large attack surface for attackers who are
exploiting a memory corruption vulnerability.
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B. Attack Scenario. As shown in Figure 13, it is obvious that an
attacker can compromise function 1 in task Y through a buffer
overflow to redirect the control flow to function 2 in task X.
C. Cause Analysis. First, traditional OSs use MMU to abstract
physical memory in the form of virtual memory for restricting
tasks’ access accessibility, while RTOSs deployed on IoT devices do
not support this feature. Second, MPU roughly divides the physical
memory into MPU regions of a fixed number, each assigned with
different access permissions under both privileged and unprivileged
modes. But this lightweight access control design cannot provide
such isolation of the same level as that by MMU.
D. IdentifyingMethod. To identify this vulnerability, the attacker
needs to determine the target task X who contains a function 2,
whose entry address is known to the attacker. Then, the attacker
finds or designs a intermediary task Y who contains a trampoline-
function (e.g., function 1) with the potential ability to jump to the
target address of the attack and cannot resist thememory corruption
attack (e.g., buffer overflow). Finally, if the attacker can compromise
the function 1 to call function 2, it is considered that there actually
is an inadequate task isolation vulnerability.
E. Defences. Kim et al. [12] designed a security architecture that
virtually partitions the memory space and enforces memory access
control of a RTOS. Through off-line analysis on identifying the
reachable memory regions of a task, they used MPU to conduct
run-time memory access control for each task and finally reduces
the memory spaces which are open to attackers.
11 DISCUSSION
In this section, we comment on a few things we learned from the
elaborated IoT logic bugs.
11.1 Some Vulnerabilities are Inherited from
Traditional Computing systems
Obviously, some logic bugs root from the design issues of traditional
computing systems, such as authentication bypassing and task
isolation vulnerabilities. Since in traditional computing systems
there have been many advanced defense techniques, we are curious
of what holds back IoT platforms and devices from applying off-
the-shelf defenses and solutions. We try to answer this question
from two aspects.
Human-related Reasons. First, most IoT devices are low-cost
energy-efficient devices. However, many additional security fea-
tures rely on hardware components such as physical unclonable
functions (PUFs) and cryptography chips, not only the price of SoC
could be raised accordingly, but also increased power consump-
tion and reduced use lifetime. Second, as IoT business continues
to grow, manufacturers are facing increased time-to-market pres-
sure. Although security is a concern, manufacturers tend to reuse
existing code base, which is obsolete and less tested on the Internet.
Besides the IoT program and applications are becoming more and
more complicated, few companies are willing to harm the profit
by rewriting the whole application applying security features or
carrying out security tests on existing code.
Technical Challenges. Many IoT devices are powered by light-
weight microcontrollers (e.g., ARM cortex-m and MSP430) and have
less memory resource, thus instead of well-armed systems, they
can only run lightweight RTOS or even bare-metal systems. How-
ever, most of these lightweight systems lack mitigation protections
like WˆX and ASLR. For instance, any code based on FreeRTOS is
running in supervisor mode. Even some microcontrollers support
hardware security features like MPU [25], but we found few IoT
platforms adapt it well. Furthermore, additional software-based
TEE implementations introduce performance overhead. For exam-
ple, as shown in previous research [12], they observed that the
kernel-memory-enable RTOS systems failed to meet the deadline
constraints of the real-time tasks.
Overall, most IoT platforms and systems still suffer from classical
logic bugs just as previous computer software does.
11.2 New Challenges in Securing IoT Platforms
There are also new security challenges brought by the unique design
features of the emerging IoT applications.
More Entities Involved. Compared with traditional computing
systems, there are more entities involved. In traditional computing
systems, only the client and the server need to mutually authenti-
cate each other and the authorization is then performed based on
the identification information and access control policies. In the IoT
platform, more entities (the IoT device, the cloud and the mobile
app) are involved. This makes authentication and authorization
more complicated. If authentication or authorization are not im-
plemented properly, security problem may arise. For example, as
shown in Section 6.2, to send a falsified request, the attackers only
need to bypass device authentication. Similar problems also result
in Bug 3 as mentioned in Section 5.2.
As the interactions among the three entities become complicated,
the working state management becomes necessary and should be
paid more attention. As revealed in Section 6.2, exploiting unex-
pected state transitions can cause serious consequences.
Interaction with Physical World. Through IoT automation ser-
vices, IoT devices interact with their surrounding environment. This
new interaction model brings about potential security hazards. For
example, as discussed in Section 8 and Section 7.2, if users deploy
several automation trigger-action apps in one smart home, multiple
indirect interactions may unexpectedly influence each other due to
race conditions of the same event, missing events, etc. The attackers
can take advantage of this design vulnerability to indirectly control
the victim’s devices.
Unattended Usage. Unlike the PCs or mobile phones, typically,
IoT users do not need physical access to the IoT devices but remotely
monitor and control the devices via mobile apps or web services.
Therefore, it is hard to verify the real-time status of IoT devices
and be aware of the unexpected behaviors of devices in time. This
makes it easier for the attacker to disguise their attack behaviors.
As described in bug 7, since the victim can only remotely check
his mobile app, he cannot observe any unusual status of the device
in his smartphone (although it has been substituted by a phantom
device).
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Shared Devices. The IoT devices are often shared among family
members, friends or even strangers from time to time. For example,
as mentioned in Section 4.1, the smart home devices have been
widely used in rentals and hospitality services. In a previous study, it
was found that 60% of guests would actually pay more for a vacation
rental home with a smart home feature [4]. This makes it easier
for the attackers to get local or even physical access to the devices.
Thus, hard-coding sensitive device information like credential and
identification information become risky for IoT devices, even if the
credential is long enough and unpredictable.
12 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide a review of the recently discovered logic
bugs that are specific to IoT platforms and systems. In particular, 17
logic bugs and one weakness falling into seven categories of vulner-
abilities are reviewed in this survey, and the seven categories are as
follows: authentication problems, over-privileged capabilities, out
of synchronization at platform-level, sensor data out of synchro-
nization, unexpected trigger actions in IoT apps, unexpected code
injection, and task sandboxing vulnerabilities in RTOS.
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